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Inventors and organizational assets are inputs of inventive activities which are often
provided at a global scale, where countries might specialize in the provision of one or
the  other  type  of  inputs.  We  introduce  a  new patent-based  metric,  the  “inventor
balance”, to quantify this type of functional specialization, which we discover to be
considerable,  and we propose a conceptual framework to explain it.  We observe a
progressive  “decoupling”  of  national  sub-systems  providing respectively  inventors
and  organizational  assets.  Moreover,  we  find  that  countries  with  a  high  level  of
innovativeness  relative  to  their  economic  development,  high  technological
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1. Introduction
Inventions are the work of individuals who operate within organizations, most often,
firms.  Inventors  and  organizations,  as  inputs  in  the  production  of  inventions,  are
themselves  the  output  of  complex  processes,  which  are  largely  shaped  by  the
interactions between institutions of various types. Also, inventions might be produced
at an international scale, which implies that organizations might source inventors and
other  relevant  assets  from abroad.  As  a  result,  countries  might  specialize  in  the
provision  of  some  inputs  of  the  inventive  process  –  be  them  inventors,  or
organizations. In this paper we aim to study the extent and motives of such form of
functional specialization, which so far has attracted scant and unsystematic attention.
In the background of the phenomena which we analyze, lie  the motivations
behind  multinational  enterprises’  (MNEs)  decisions  to  internationalize  their  R&D
activities.  These  might  be  either  of  the  'asset  exploiting'  or  'augmenting'  type,
according to Kuemmerle (1997), while Lewin et al. (2009) show that one of the main
reasons  leading  US  firms  to  offshore  R&D  is  the  relative  scarcity  of  domestic
inventors and skilled workers. Other studies have indicated that countries having a
comparative advantage in highly-skilled personnel attract complementary assets from
multinational corporations (Ernst 2002, Arora and Gambardella 2005, and Iammarino
and McCann 2013).
Such  strategies,  and  their  effects,  should  be  seen  in  the  light  of  global
knowledge  flows  among  MNEs’  different  locations,  in  a  situation  where
organizational  capabilities  to  manage  them  effectively  represent  a  key  factor  to
deliver  valuable  innovations  (Laurens  et  al.  2015a,  and  Gammeltoft  2006). In
particular,  evidence  at  the  firm level  suggests  that,  since  the  turn  of  the  century,
MNEs have been consolidating the previous advances in R&D internationalization, so
as to better organize knowledge flows among remote locations (Laurens et al. 2015a
and 2015b).  In turn, such consolidation might contribute to the observed widening of
the technological gaps between countries close to the technology frontier and the rest
of the world (see Castellacci 2011, and Toivanen and Suominen 2015, who single out
China  and India  as  exceptions),  as  leader  countries  focus  on knowledge-intensive
tasks,  and  followers  on  imitation  and  standardized  inventions  (see,  e.g.,  Kemeny
2011). These changes might be interpreted according to evolutionary theory, where
“capitalist development is shown to be a process of alternating periods of convergence
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and divergence, with some signs of a shift towards divergence recently” (Fagerberg
and Verspagen 2002).
Firms do not strategize in the void, but rather against a backdrop partly shaped
by  public  policies.  First,  what  is  beneficial  for  an  individual  firm,  might  not  be
desirable collectively: outbound knowledge flows may produce negative externalities
on local competitors (or on the whole country, as in the case of military or dual-use
technologies).  For  this  reason,  we  observe  policies  aimed  at  limiting  transfers  of
technology abroad. Most importantly,  policies  often attempt  to encourage inbound
flows of  knowledge.  They might  provide incentives  for  foreign  firms  to  establish
R&D labs domestically, as in the case of those Chinese policies conditioning generic
FDI inflows on such decision,  or,  for  India,  facilitating  the  re-location  of  foreign
plants(see  Zanatta  et  al.  2008).  Such  foreign  presence  might  generate  spillovers,
which  crucially  depend  on  broadly  defined  domestic  absorption  capabilities.  The
latter also are the object of policies, for example encouraging technical education, or
attempting to attract complementary assets from foreign multinational corporations.
The  degree  of  success  of  such  policies  in  establishing  indigenous  inventive
capabilities varies, and has been widely debated (see, among many others, Athreye
and Cantwell 2007, and Castellacci 2011). 
Within such context, in this paper we show that functional specialization of
inventive activities is a relevant phenomenon not only when contrasting developing
and advanced economies, but also among countries belonging to the latter group. We
quantify  functional  specialization  by  introducing  a  new  patent-based  metric,  the
“inventor balance”, measuring  the degree by which a country contributes  relatively
more inventors than organizational assets to the production of international patents.
The  inventor  balance  exploits  the  distinction,  present  in  patent  records,  between
inventors (who are invariably persons) and applicants (which in most cases are firms).
It equals zero when there is no imbalance, and it ranges between – 1 (in the extreme
theoretical case where a country contributes only applicants, and no inventors) and +
1 (in the opposite extreme polar case).
We compute the inventor  balance for the period 1980-2009 for a  set  of 34
countries, also separately for distinct families of technologies. Some countries, such
as the United States and Switzerland, are specialized contributors of organizational
assets, while others, such as China, Italy, and the United Kingdom, mostly provide
inventors. In between we identify a group of countries that are weakly specialized
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overall, but display specialization in one or more technologies.
To  explain  the  observed  patterns  of  functional  specialization,  we  build  on
studies theorizing the role of institutions in innovation systems, and present a stylized
conceptual framework leading to a set of testable hypotheses.2 Institutions play an
important  role  in  shaping  the  motivations  of  firms  to  internationalize  their  R&D
activities and, when exploiting their assets abroad, firms also leverage on the general
characteristics of the domestic innovation system where they are embedded. In trying
to  augment  their  assets  through  internationalization,  they  eventually  become
embedded  into,  and  benefit  from,  the  innovation  system abroad  (Criscuolo  et  al.
2005). Such an approach, in other words, takes a ‘macro’ perspective, which enlarges
a more familiar and also narrower view of what defines the relevant assets that inform
firms' decisions to internationalize.
We focus on the inventive step and consider a country's economy where  two
domestic  sub-systems  interact,  one  providing  organizations,  the  other  supplying
inventors.  Organizations  and  inventors  together  produce  inventions,  within  an
“invention  production  function”  of  which  they  are  the  inputs.  When
internationalization is present, a share of domestic inventors might be matched with
foreign organizations, and vice-versa. One of the main testable hypotheses that we
derive from our conceptual framework is that, as internationalization progresses, the
interactions  between  the  two  domestic  sub-systems  weakens,  leading  to  their
progressive “decoupling” - that  is,  to they becoming more independent  from each
other. In fact, there is mutual causation between decoupling and internationalization,
because the former also motivates the latter. Our data supports such contention, also
by showing that the observed imbalances on average tend to grow in time.
Our conceptual framework provides other testable hypotheses, guiding our search
for factors explaining observed patterns of functional specialization. We anticipate the
main results. We find that greater internationalization of R&D is associated with more
functional specialization. Countries that are not very innovative, relative to their level
of economic development, are found to contribute more inventors than applicants, as
do those  with  a  high  degree  of  technological  specialization  relative  to  the  world
average. Moreover, the inventor balance depends on a country's relative abundance of
2 See Edquist (1997), Lundvall (1992), and Nelson and Winter (1982). For con-
siderations  about  the  internationalization  of  innovation  systems  see  also  Carlsson
(2006), and Soete et al. (2010).
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inventors  vs. applicants. Last, we find that  informal institutions and “soft” features
(Crescenzi et al. 2016), such as cultural traits, play a role in explaining the observed
imbalances.  In  particular,  countries  where  individualistic  traits  prevail  tend  to
contribute relatively more inventors than applicants.
We  proceed  as  follows.  In  the  next  two  sections  we  illustrate  a  conceptual
framework aimed at explaining the inventor balance. In section 4 we present the data
and  we  introduce  a  measure  of  functional  specialization,  the  “inventor  balance”,
which in section 5 is the object of a descriptive analysis. Section 6 presents results
using inferential methods, and section 7 concludes.
2. A Conceptual Framework
Systemic theories of innovation have mostly focused on national systems, and as
such they have been challenged by the internationalization of R&D activities  (see
Carlsson 2006, and Soete et al. 2010). In this light, and of particular relevance to us,
Criscuolo et al.  (2005) propose a 'macro'  perspective on the internationalization of
multinational enterprises (MNEs). Such view certainly accepts that MNEs decisions
to  internationalize  R&D  are  motivated  by  traditional  'narrow'  reasons,  such  as
exploiting  firms'  assets,  and  augmenting  them  by  tapping  into  assets  abroad
(Kuemmerle 1997). However, the overall characteristics of the innovation systems in
which a firm is embedded, both at home and abroad, should also matter. When a firm
internationalizes, “it seeks to exploit not only its own technological assets, but also
those associated with its home country innovatory milieu”, and likewise, it “engage[s]
in R&D in a foreign location to avail [itself] of complementary assets that are location
specific, essentially aiming to explicitly internalise several aspects of the systems of
innovation of the host location” (Criscuolo et al. 2005).3 
We espouse such ‘macro’ perspective, where firms’ actions, being embedded in
such a broader context,  are such that they might trigger systemic effects,  resulting
from the interplay of numerous actors at the micro-level (Soete et al. 2010). Outcomes
are determined by market forces and are mediated by many non-market formal (e.g.,
the higher-education  system,  laws) and informal  institutions  (e.g.,  broadly defined
3 Dunning and Narula (1995) also provide evidence that home-base augmenting 
motivations are explicitly driven by the characteristics of the whole innovation system
at the foreign location.
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cultural traits, traditions, social norms and social capital).4
We focus  on  the  inventive  step,  and  we  thus  refer  to  invention  (rather  than
innovation)  systems. Our conceptual  framework revolves around the production of
inventions, which results from the interaction of organizations with inventors, within
an  invention  production  function.  Organizations  are  sets  of  routines  and  assets
(Nelson and Winter 1982), and we define “inventor grade” workers as professionals
who are potentially capable of developing new processes or products. Such workers,
however,  might also be employed otherwise, for example, as engineers on the shop
floor.  We assume long-distance knowledge flows to be problematic,  both because
human capital is not very mobile, and because much knowledge is tacit (Almeida and
Kogut 1999). Such relative immobility in fact is a chief reason for MNEs to offshore
R&D, as we reviewed in the previous section.
Inventors and organizations are inputs in the production of inventions, and in turn
they are the outputs of two complex sub-systems, which we call the “inventors sub-
system”  and  the  “organizations  sub-system”.  Figure  1  illustrates  the  conceptual
framework, showing the two sub-systems both for the home country, and for a generic
foreign country. The supply of inventors and of organizations of the home country is
located  at  the  top  of  Figure  1,  where  thick  arrows  represent  the  collaboration  of
domestic inventors and organizations to produce inventions. 
[Figure 1 about here]
The  inventors  sub-system  is  shaped  by educational  institutions  and  also  by
broadly  defined  cultural  traits.  The  organizations  sub-system comprises  a  more
diverse set of institutions, including agencies of various types which shape innovation
processes  and policies  (the  “knowledge  infrastructure”,  Smith  1998),  coordination
mechanisms among actors  (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993),  the intellectual  property
right system, labour market laws, and social norms.
The different elements of the model are linked by mutual relationships which
we  call  “feedbacks”  (thin  arrows  in  Figure  1).  We  consider  first  the  feedbacks
between  the  two  sub-systems  within  the  same  country,  whose  strength  is  an
interesting and problematic issue. To fix ideas, we begin by assuming the hypothetical
4 On institutions,  and on their role within innovation processes, see Freeman
(1987), North (1990), Edquist and Johnson  (1997), and Coriat and Weinstein (2002).
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case  where  there  is  no  internationalization  in  inventive  activities,  which  we  later
admit.
First, we note that in the production of inventions, the degree of substitutability
between inventors  and organizations  is  bound to be limited.5 For  this  reason,  any
relative  imbalance  in  the  two  productive  inputs  would  reverberate  backward,
generating a re-adjustment of the two sub-systems. For example, a relative scarcity of
invention-grade  professionals  might  eventually  induce  the  inventors  sub-system to
increase their supply, possibly because entrepreneurs successfully lobby to increase
public expenditure in higher education. Without any such action, scarcity in skilled
personnel  would hamper  the activities  of firms.  As a  consequence,  some of them
would  be  forced  off  the  market,  or  their  growth  would  be  hindered,  so  that  the
imbalance would eventually be addressed via a reduction of demand of inventors.
Such adjustments would take time to occur and also, likely, would be weak,  because
the  sub-systems  cater  to  needs  beyond  the  production  of  inventions  or  inventive
organizations. For example, a rapidly developing country might provide an increasing
number  of  highly  skilled  professionals,  who  in  part  would  be  of  inventor  grade.
However, only few of them would be employed as inventors in domestic firms, which
would take time to become truly innovative, so that the oversupply of these potential
inventors would persist. In summary, even without internationalization, the feedbacks
between the two sub-systems would be weak and delayed.
More  generally,  policy-making  enters  our  framework  in  two ways:  first,  by
shaping the elements of the organizations and inventors sub-systems, and second, by
strengthening the feedbacks between them. The case of education policies belongs to
the first type.  Across the world, they are often seen as a starting point to develop
absorptive  capacity  and  to  attract  complementary  assets  from  multinational
corporations  (Zanatta  et  al.  2008).  As the organization  of  cross-border  knowledge
flows is increasingly becoming a core goal for multinationals firms (Laurens et al.
2015a  and  2015b,  Gammeltoft  2006),  relevant  policies  include  those  fostering
5 For example,  a  firm facing  a  scarcity  of  inventors  may partially  substitute
them with more capital goods, such as better laboratories, or with better complemen-
tary services to enhance the productivity of the available human capital. However, rel-
ative imbalances in the two inputs most likely would not result in much factor substi-
tution within a given production process, but rather in the choice of production pro-
cesses that are compatible with the given relative availability of inputs.
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coordination  mechanisms  among  actors  and addressing intellectual  property  rights
and their enforcement. These policies often aim at internationalizing the system, with
implications to be discussed in the next section. Other national policies, whose goal is
to strengthen feedbacks, aim at favouring the matching of resources within the two
sub-systems, acting against their decoupling. This might be achieved by incentivizing
employment  of  highly  educated  specialists  by  firms  (instead  of  academia),  as  in
Brazil;  by creating academia-enterprise hubs; or, as in in several countries’ higher
education system, by setting outreach and forms of external engagement as an explicit
goal of universities - their so-called “third mission”.
3. Testable Hypotheses
The  main  insight  of  our  conceptual  framework  is  that  internationalization,
whose feedbacks are shown in Figure 1 by the dashed arrows, further “decouples” the
two sub-systems at  the  national  level,  and is  both  cause and effect,  of  functional
specialization. Such conclusion derives directly from the fact that, when the inputs of
the inventions production function may also be sourced abroad, potential  domestic
inventors are also employable by foreign firms, whereas domestic firms may also hire
foreign inventors. As a consequence, the effects of any imbalance between inventors
and organizations on the two sub-systems would be even weaker, and adjustments
take longer, compared to the case of a purely domestic production of inventions which
we considered above. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: The observed patterns of functional specialization of countries in the provision of
inventor and organizations are persistent in time.
Increased internationalization of R&D, which we observe until at least the turn
of the century, by weakening the feedbacks between the inventors and organizations
sub-systems further,  would then  be associated  with their   progressive  decoupling.
Internationalization and  decoupling of  sub-systems  co-evolve,  and  reinforce  each
other: as feedbacks weaken, imbalances grow, and inventors and organizations have a
stronger incentive to seek their desired matching assets abroad. In turn, such increased
internationalization further increases the decoupling of the two sub-systems and, as a
8
consequence,  it  increases  relative  imbalances.6 These  considerations  lead  to  the
second of our testable hypotheses:
H2: An increase in the internationalization of inventive activities is associated with
an increase  in  countries'  relative  imbalances  in  the  contribution  of  inventors  vs.
organizations.
The demand for inventors relative to generic specialized professionals varies
across  countries,  depending  on  the  degree  of  innovativeness  and  economic
development.  The demand for inventor-grade workers is relatively higher in countries
which  are  highly  innovative  relative  to  their  degree  of  economic  development,
because such personnel is employed both for the needs of producing inventions, and
of general production. On the other hand, countries which innovate little relative to
their degree of economic development have a relative over-supply of inventor-grade
specialists. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:
H3:  A  country’s  relative  functional  specialization  in  the  contribution  of
inventors is negatively  associated with its  innovativeness,  relative to its  degree of
economic development.
The next testable hypotheses (H4 – H6) all stem from considerations of the
possible  determinants of motives of R&D outsourcing by multinational firms which,
as we argued, besides narrowly considering their own assets and immediate needs,
also have broader interests of a 'macro'  type.  Within this backdrop,  when deciding
where  to  carry  out  their  inventive  activities,  asset-augmenting  firms  take  into
consideration the relative availability of inventive resources provided by the inventors
sub-system.  If  one  country  has  relatively  few  inventors,  relative  to  domestic
organizations willing to hire them, tougher competition for such scarce resource in the
home  country  pushes  domestic  organizations  to  source  inventors  from  abroad,
resulting in an inventor deficit in the home country. Relative abundance of factors in
6 Please note that the focus is on relative, and not absolute imbalances. All else
being equal, absolute imbalances on average increase with internationalization. This is
not necessarily the case for imbalances relative to the level of internationalization.
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the aggregate within countries, in other words, should affect the observed degree of
functional specialization: 
H4:  A  country’s  functional  specialization  in  the  contribution  of  inventors  vs.
organizations  depends positively on the relative abundance of inventors,
and:
H5: A country’s functional specialization in the contribution of inventors depends
negatively on the relative abundance of organizations.
Organizational  routines,  such  as  managerial  skills,  to  some  extent  are
transferable across sectors; however, specialized invention-grade researchers often are
not – a biotechnology scientist would not be able to invent in electrical engineering.
For  this  reason,  MNEs have strong incentives  to  search those sectoral  specialists,
which are in short supply at home, in those foreign countries where they are relatively
specialized in the desired technologies (for similar considerations, see Cantwell and
Vertova 2004). This amounts to surmise that country i’s inventors are relatively more
attractive when country i’s technological specialization is high, and country j’s is low.
However, as we argued, the attractiveness of a foreign innovation system stems not
only from its patterns of specialization, but also from its overall characteristics. Firms
seeking inventive assets abroad explicitly aim to internalise features of the foreign
system of  innovation  (Criscuolo  et  al.  2005).  As a  consequence,  we expect  some
countries to be attractive not only in the technological sectors of specialization but, to
an  extent,  across  the  spectrum  of  technologies.  From  these  considerations,  the
following hypothesis emerges:
H6: A country’s  functional  specialization  in  inventors  (organizations)  depends
positively  (negatively)  on  the  degree  of  technological  specialization.  Specialized
countries tend to display inventor surpluses across the spectrum of technologies.
Within the 'macro' view on motivations for internationalization of R&D which
we have embraced, other overall characteristics of the innovation systems, at home
and abroad, might contribute to explaining the observed functional specialization. We
consider first the strength of protection for intellectual property rights (IPR; see Park
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2008). Countries with stronger IPR protection are more likely to act as providers of
organizations, considering that multinational firms usually file their patents through
the headquarters in the home country (on this aspect, see the discussion in the next
section). Such an effect would follow from the presence of a comparative advantage
for foreign firms in the country providing inventors, because they would be better able
to enforce IPR with respect to local ones.
Finally,  theories  of  innovation  systems  place  a  prominent  role  on  cultural
dimensions  and  informal  institutions  (Edquist  and  Johnson  1997).  The  degree  of
individualism of a society has been found to have a positive effect on the level of
output and of patenting activity across countries (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2016
and 2011) and also across  regions  within the same country (in  the United States,
Gorodnichenko  and  Roland  2011,  in  China,  Talhelm  et  al.  2014).  Different
explanations of such findings have been advanced. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011)
argue that individualistic cultures reward inventors with more prestige, while Talhelm
et al. (2014) and Henrich (2014) propose that individualistic societies prize analytical
reasoning, which in turn enhances novelty and creativity.
We are interested in the possible effects of individualistic traits not on cross-
border  inventive  collaborations  per  se,  but  on  the  presence  of  imbalances in  the
relative provisions of organizations and inventors. Any such effect would arise from
the presence of a differential effect of a given cultural trait on the two sub-systems.
We anticipate that our results in this respect depend on whether we consider or not the
United States which, in terms of the measure of individualism that we use (Hofstede
2001), is both the most individualistic country and the home-base of world-leading
highly innovative organizations.
4. The Data and the Inventor balance
We use the Patstat database (European Patent Office 2013a, 2013b) and we
consider all priority applications of 34 countries filed at any of a group of 50 patent
offices from 1980 to 2009, representing the virtual totality of worldwide patenting
activity. We employ the methodology presented in De Rassenfosse et al. (2013), and
whenever  for  simplicity  we  mention  patents,  in  fact  we  always  mean  patent
applications. We distinguish between inventors and applicants. While inventors are
always  individuals,  applicants  may  be  firms,  universities  and  other  research
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institutions,  governmental  organizations,  non-profit  organizations  and,  finally,  also
individuals.7 
Inventors and applicants are assigned to countries according to their address, so
subsidiaries  of  multinational  firms  are  recorded  as  separate  entities  and  are  not
consolidated with the headquarters country. We define a patent to be “international” if
at least one of its inventors and/or applicants resides, or is headquartered, in a country
different from those of the others. In our population of 16.212.708 patents we do not
identify the nature of the applicant, because it would be prohibitively costly to do so. 
Patent  applications  are  assigned  to  one  or  more  codes  describing  their
technology according to the WIPO’s International Patent Classification (WIPO 2011).
We adopt the taxonomy proposed by Schmoch (2008), who identifies 35 technologies
that can be regrouped into five macro-technologies:  electrical  engineering (Electr),
instruments  (Instr),  chemistry  (Chem),  mechanical  engineering  (Mech),  and  other
fields (Other).
We  express  country  i portfolio  of  patents  in  the  year  t as  Invit or  Appit,
depending  on  whether  the  inventor  or  the  applicant  criterion  is  adopted.  This
distinction is important for our empirical exercise. For example, a multinational from
country A may employ an inventor from country B to produce a patent, which for
country A would count as one patent if we use the applicant criterion, but zero if we
adopt the inventor criterion (the opposite would apply for country B). It follows that
countries’ patent  portfolios may diverge depending on whether they are computed
using  either  criterion.  Also,  the  example  above  shows  a  case  of  functional
specialization,  where  country  A  only  provides  organizations,  and  country  B  only
inventors.
A first possible concern about the data arises if multinational enterprises file
applications  in a country where there is a favourable tax treatment  for intellectual
property,  rather than in the country where the inventive activities were developed.
However,  in  some  instances  such  transfer  is  prohibited  by  law,  and  the  existing
7 Picci (2010) analyses a sample of 1000 such “international” patents to find
that in 79% of cases, the applicant is a MNE’s subsidiary or headquarter, and another
15% of cases involve firms which are not multinationals. Our population of patents is
roughly twice that analysed in Picci (2010), since we consider additional (minor) pat-
ent offices and a longer time interval. Further details on all data used in this paper are
in the Data Appendix.
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literature suggests that “intellectual property migration” should not affect significantly
patent statistics.8 A second possible concern is that assigning inventors to a country
according to their address might lead to mis-measurement due to temporary migration
of  inventors.  However,  the  available  evidence,  and in  particular  Thomson (2013),
finds  no  significant  impact  of  cross-border  migration.  This  is  consistent  with  the
evidence that human capital is rather immobile across borders (Almeida and Kogut
1999). 
To  measure  the  intensity  of  collaborations  between  any two countries,  we
employ the most general measure of internationalization introduced by Picci (2010):
InvAppijt. It is a (fully fractional) multiplicative count of patent applications involving
inventors of country i and applicants of country j, in a given year t (the year subscript
is henceforth omitted for simplicity). The InvAppij measure can be interpreted as the
strength of the collaboration between country i’s inventors and country j’s applicant.
We refer to Appendix A.1 for more information, and to Picci (2010) for a detailed
description of this and related measures; here it suffices to underline that this measure
aggregates to the overall country portfolios, because, considering a set of countries













Note that the summations include the case when i=j, i.e., the own contribution of a
country’s inventors or applicants to the total country portfolio.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 provides a summary of the patent portfolios of the top-ten countries in
8 See  the  discussions  in  Thomson  (2013,  Section  3),  and  in  Danguy  et  al.
(2014); Picci (2010), in the cited sample of 1000 international patents which he con-
siders, finds that 82.6% multinational enterprises filed their applications through their
headquarters (see his Table 3). 
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terms of number of patents in 2009. It witnesses the very high number of Japanese
patents, a well-known fact partly consequent on their relatively narrow scope (Cohen
et al. 2002, and Sakikabara and Branstetter 2001). Also, Table 1 shows the surge in
Korean and in Chinese patents over the most recent years.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 reports for a small group of important countries  InvApp|Inv, one of the
relative measures of internationalization introduced by Picci (2010).9 The degree of
internationalization has increased in time, possibly with a degree of reversion in the
last years of the sample, as also witnessed in Laurens et al. (2015a) and (2015b). It is
pronounced  enough  to  make  a  priori  plausible  that  functional  specialization  in
inventive  activities  is  a  phenomenon  deserving  attention  –  in  a  world  without
internationalization, there could not be any functional specialization.
4.1 The “inventor balance”
To measure  the  degree  and  type  of  functional  specialization  of  a  country,  we
introduce  the  “inventor  balance”,  which  we  may  compute  both  between  pairs  of
countries, and also between one country and the rest of the world. 




,        [2]
where ijInvApp >0 or jiInvApp >0.
It is equal to the relative imbalance in inventors vs. applicants in the collaborative
inventive activities involving country i’s inventors and country j’s applicants. InvBalij
ranges from -1 to +1. It is equal to zero if there is no imbalance between country i and
9 The upper bound of such measure is 0.5 (or 50%), corresponding to the max-
imum possible degree of internationalization.  Intuitively, this is so because the mea-
sure accounts for both the international and the domestic component of patent produc-
tion, with the latter being present even when the degree of internationalization is at its
maximum. See Appendix A.1 and Picci (2010) for additional details. 
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country  j.   If InvBalij >0, we say that country  i displays an “Inventor Surplus” (or
“Applicant  Deficit”),  i.e.  it  contributes  relatively  more  inventors  than  applicants
compared  to  country  j.  The  symmetric  nature  of  the  inventor  balance  means  that
“Inventors  Surplus”  and  “Applicant  Deficit”  are  synonyms  and  can  be  used
interchangeably. Likewise, if InvBalij <0, country i displays an “Inventor Deficit” (or
“Applicant Surplus”). 
The lower bound ( InvBalij = -1) corresponds to the theoretical extreme case where
country  i contributes  only  applicants  and  no  inventors  to  the  joint  production  of
inventions with country j, while at the upper bound ( InvBalij = +1) the opposite holds.
If country i displays an inventor surplus, country j displays an inventor deficit of the
same entity.  InvBalij  can be computed both for all technological sectors, and also
separately for individual  technological  sectors,  a possibility that  we exploit  in our
analysis.
The  inventor  balance  with  respect  to  the  “Rest  Of  the  World”,  InvBali,ROW,
measures whether country i contributes to the production of international innovations

















, j≠i.                        [3]
Analogously to the bilateral case, InvBali , ROW = +1 in the extreme theoretical case
where country  i only contributes inventors,  and no applicant,  to the production of
international patents anywhere in the world, and  InvBali , ROW = -1 in the opposite
case.
Using [1a] and [1b], straightforward calculations allow us to express [3] so as to






This  formulation  of  the  inventor  balance  has  an  intuitive  appeal.  The  numerator
expresses the difference in a country portfolio depending on which counting criterion
is employed. A positive value indicates a prominence of inventors over applicants,
which  necessarily  reflects  a  situation  where  national  inventors  outweigh  national
applicants in producing international inventions. The denominator is a normalization
factor,  and  intuitively  equals  twice  the  national  contribution  to  international
innovations.10 It is the normalization needed to assure that −1≤InvBal i, ROW≤+1 .
5. Descriptive analysis of the inventor balance
In  Table  2  we  show  the  inventor  balance,  for  selected  countries,  relative  to  all
technologies and computed for the last decade of the time period under consideration
(2000-2009).
[Table 2 about here]
We focus first on the third column, reporting the inventor balance with respect
to the rest of the world. We observe ample variations across countries. Some of them,
such as the United States and Switzerland, have a significant applicant surplus, while
for  others,  such as  China,  Italy and the  UK, the  opposite  holds.  To interpret  the
results, consider that an inventor balance greater than 1/3 (smaller than -1/3) implies
that the relative contribution of organizations is twice (half) that of inventors. The
extent of the observed imbalances (75% of the values of column three are greater than
10 If every patent were produced by entities residing, or being headquartered, in
the same country (that is, if there were no internationalization)  then it would follow
that Invit = Appit  for any i and t. Whenever Invit ≠ Appit , the divergence in the fraction-
al count must be associated with the presence of international collaborations in patent-
ing activities. InvBali , ROW is related to Thomson (2013) “net R&D offshoring”, which,
using our notation, equals (Appi-Invi)/Invi.  (see his Table 3, 3rd column). Our measure
differs from Thomson’s in the denominator, which in our case normalizes the metric
so that its range is (-1,+1). On the other hand, Thomson’s measure is bounded be-
tween -1 and + ∞, which complicates  its  interpretation,  since it  is  not  symmetric
around zero.
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1/3 in  absolute  value)  confirms  that,  indeed,  we observe  a  pronounced pattern  of
functional specialization in the production of innovative activities at a global scale,
where some countries  are  strongly specialized  in contributing  organizations,  while
others predominantly contribute inventors.
For interpretative purposes, we divide countries into three groups:
1. Specialized  applicant  providers:  countries  whose  InvBali ,ROW <  -1/3.
(Switzerland, South Korea, The Netherlands, and the United States).
2. Specialized  inventor  providers:  countries  whose  InvBali , ROW > 1/3.  (Canada,
China, France, Italy, United Kingdom).
3. Weakly  specialized providers: countries  for which -1/3 ≤  InvBali , ROW  ≤ 1/3.
(Germany, Japan and Taiwan).
The  next  columns  of  Table  2  show  the  bilateral  inventor  balance  for  all
technologies.  To analyse  these results,  we should consider that  InvBali,ROW may be
seen as a weighted average of the various InvBalij, so that, for example, a “specialized
applicant  provider” is expected to have bilateral  applicant  surpluses  vis-à-vis most
other  countries.  Those  countries  mostly  have  positive  bilateral  inventor  balances.
Whenever it is negative, the other country also belongs to the “specialized applicant
provider” group, with South Korea and Switzerland, displaying an applicant deficit
vis-a-vis Taiwan, as exceptions. The case of the United States stands out, both for the
size of its economy and for the extent of its innovative activities. In the next section,
where we research the determinants of the inventor balance, we shall comment upon
such an instance of  “American exceptionalism”.
Countries belonging to the group of the specialized inventor providers, on the
other hand, mostly display bilateral inventor surpluses. Cases of inventor deficit are
vis-à-vis countries of the same group – with the exception of Canada, which has an
inventor deficit with respect to The Netherlands. Countries in the intermediate group
of  weakly  specialized  providers  all  have  an  applicant  deficit  vis-à-vis the  United
States, but never with respect to specialized inventor providers.
Within each group there are countries that differ in other dimensions. Among
specialized applicants providers there are only mature industrialized countries (South
Korea, by now, belonging to this category). These are invariably countries which both
have  a  richly  textured  economic  structure,  and  also  an  educational  sector  strong
enough to supply many inventors. Within specialized inventor providers, instead, we
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observe an emerging country such as China,  together  with more mature  industrial
countries. Such coexistence hints at the presence of dynamic factors explaining the
relative  strength of  applicants  vs.  inventors.  In  particular,  as  China’s  native  firms
become more robust and active abroad,  the current  strong applicant  deficits  could
possibly  turn  out  to  be  only  a  temporary  phase  within  a  development  trajectory.
Different dynamics affect countries such as Canada, Italy or the UK, which like China
are specialized inventor providers, but that have been industrial countries for a longer
while.11
In  Table  3  we  show  InvBal i ,ROW  ,  also  separately  for  the  five  broad
technological fields, for each decade considered. Note that the values for the inventor
balance for all technologies in the third decade are reported both in Table 3 and in the
third column of Table 2.
[Table 3 about here]
Most  countries  display  an  inventor  balance  which  is  rather  stable  in  time,
providing support for our hypothesis H1. There are however some exceptions. Taiwan
experienced a surge in the applicant surplus in the second decade, which was reversed
later. Germany saw its inventor balance progressively change over time from a deficit
to a surplus. For transition economies, the presence of an inventor surplus could be a
transient  phase,  as  they  develop  an  industrial  base  able  to  be  proactive  abroad.
However, the data for China do not show (yet) a turnaround: its inventor surplus has
become more pronounced in time, as that country has been increasingly targeted by
multinational firms as a R&D location.12
We interpret these facts in the light of the asymmetries between the inventors
and the organizations sub-systems which we discussed above, where the latter is the
11 In a supplementary results section (Table 2A), for the same group of countries
we also report bilateral inventor balances for the five broad technological fields con-
sidered.
12 The comparisons of our Table 2 with Thomson (2013) (Table 3, column 3)
“net R&D offshoring” is complicated by the fact that, as we noted, the two metrics are
defined differently;  moreover,  Thomson computes  his  measure  for  only one year.
However, by and large, the countries displaying a positive (negative) “R&D off-shor-
ing” in Thomson’s work, present an inventor deficit (surplus) in our analysis.
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result of the interplay of many more diverse institutions. Countries may more easily
target  successfully their university system for improvements, while the development
of successful multinational enterprises able to innovate internationally, besides being
all but certain, requires much time. Such differences add to the general concerns on
the weakness and delays of adjustments, that our conceptual framework brings to the
fore.
In most cases, the sign of the inventor balance for individual technologies is
the same as that of the aggregate, which we take as prima facie evidence that country-
specific  factors  influencing the inventor  balance  act  similarly for  all  technologies.
This result  is  coherent  with the presence of those system-wide effects  of national
innovation systems which contribute to our hypothesis H6.13 There are however some
exceptions  to  this  tendency.  For  example,  Japan’s  inventor  balance  is  roughly  in
equilibrium during the thirty years considered, but we observe important shifts at the
sectoral level. In particular, Instr, Mech, and Other shifted from a deficit to a surplus,
and the opposite happened to Electr. Chem, instead, recorded a sizeable and growing
inventor surplus over time.
As a last descriptive exercise, we pose the question as to whether the observed
increase in internationalization was accompanied by a progressive decoupling of the
supply of  organizations  and of  inventors  (our  hypothesis  H2).  Such a  decoupling
could manifest itself through an increase in the magnitude of imbalances in time, both
across  and  within  countries.  We  start  by  considering  the  former  case.  The  third
column of Table 3 indicates that for most countries, inventor imbalances increased in
time. For all 34 countries considered, a measure of variation within each decade14 is as
follows:  0.4062  (1980-1989),  0.4592  (1990-1999),  and  0.4713  (2000-2009).  The
observed increase in the overall amplitude of imbalances is coherent with the presence
of a progressive decoupling of the two sub-systems. 
13 The analysis of the bivariate inventor balances by sector (Table 2A in the sup-
plementary results section), indicating that countries sectoral bilateral  inventor sur-
pluses tend to have the same sign as the aggregate, confirms such result.
14 It is equal to the square root of the average of the sum of the squared applicant
balance, and as such is akin to a standard error. We also computed the median of the
absolute inventor balance, obtaining similar results. The measure of dispersion for the
sectoral measures, illustrated shortly, equals the square root of the average of the sum
of the squared inventor balance, and as such also is similar to a standard error.
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When we look within countries and across technological sectors, however, we
do not observe an increase in the imbalances. The last column of Table 3 shows a
measure of dispersion, measured for each decade, of the sectoral inventor imbalances.
The average values are 0.0739 (1980-1989), 0.0619 (1990-1999), and 0.0754 (2000-
2009). We read our findings as providing support for hypotheses  H2, in a situation
where,  as  we  argued,  effects  are  system-wide:  the  fact  that  imbalances  within
countries tend to be of the same sign across technological sectors is coherent with the
presence of system-wide effects that define the attractiveness of innovation systems to
MNEs contemplating internationalization decisions.
6. Estimation results
We here test the significance of the set of factors identified in the previous
section and, with the purpose of providing robust results, we do so in more than one
way. First, we consider a series of 30 yearly cross-section regressions, from 1980 to
2009, to explain  InvBal i, ROW , the inventor balance with respect to the rest of the
world. We consider all countries with a world share of patents at least greater than
0.1% in 2009, for a total of 27, that together account for a share of 99% of global
patenting activity.
We aggregate the results, that are shown in Table 4, in the following way. For
the 30 estimated coefficients relative to each variable, one for each year, we report the
median  value.  To  appreciate  the  overall  statistical  significance  of  the  estimated
coefficients,  we indicate first the share of estimates significant at least at the 10%
level. Then, we report the share  f of coefficients estimated to be positive. Last, we
provide an approximate binomial test, similar in spirit to the one reported in Attanasio
et  al.  (2000).  It  represents  the  probability  that  a  binomial  random variable,  with
probability of success equal to ½, records a number of successes greater that  f  , or
smaller than 1-f.15
The data used to estimate the cross-sections are also amenable to pooling and
15 Intuitively, such a probability may be seen as an upper bound p-value for the
test of the null hypotheses that the true coefficient is zero, implying a one-half prob-
ability of casually observing a point estimate which is positive, or negative (hence the
binomial nature of the problem), conditional on independence among trials.
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to estimation using a  panel  data fixed effects  model.  However,  caution should be
exercised in adopting such estimation technique. First, fixed effects estimates identify
parameters using only the time variation of the data. In the present case, where the
focus is mostly on variation across countries, such a criterion is quite onerous on the
data, implying that it could result in not detecting an effect of a given variable even
when  it  is  present.  Most  importantly,  variables  which  are  constant  in  time  are
indistinguishable from the fixed effects, and in our case most of the regressors are of
this type. These limitations notwithstanding, we also estimated a fixed effects model
on the pooled data, and will briefly report its results.
For our second main set of results, shown in Table 5, the dependent variable is
the  bilateral  inventor  balance,  InvBalij.  Focusing  on  this  variable,  instead  of
InvBali,ROW, allows us to assess the hypotheses that we derived in Section 2, even if
these are formulated in terms directly translatable in terms of InvBali,ROW. In fact, the
inventor balance with respect to the rest of the world can be interpreted as a weighted
average of the bilateral inventor balance: factors associated with the bilateral inventor
surplus will also determine its “aggregate” counterpart. This choice of the dependent
variable allows us to leverage on much more information with respect to the cross-
sectional aggregate analysis of Table 4, and does not require aggregating results from
separate  regressions.  The structure of the data is  analogous to that  familiar  in the
estimation  of gravity models.  However,  what  we estimate  is  not  a  gravity model,
because the dependent variable does not represent the intensity of a bilateral relation
(such as trade), but a (signed) imbalance of a reciprocal relation. 
Since, by construction (see Section 3),  InvBalij = -  InvBalji  , it follows that if
we included a given regressor  x twice,  once relative to country  i (xi)  and once to
country j  (xj  ),  the  two estimated  coefficients  would  result  to  be  exactly  one  the
opposite of the other. Because of this symmetric nature of the problem, we thus might
include only one regressor, the difference  x’ = xi – xj ,leading to a formulation of the
same  model  which  is  more  compact. A  positive  estimated  coefficient  is  to  be
interpreted as a positive impact  on the inventor  balance,  when present in  i,  and a
negative impact of exactly the same magnitude, when present in j.
We use an ordinary least squares estimator.  The results of this analysis  are
presented in Table 5, for two groups of countries: in Panel A, the same group of 27
countries considered also in the cross-section estimates in Table 4; in Panel B, for a
smaller group of 12 countries  with a share of patents at least greater than 0.5% in
21
2009. Focusing on a smaller set of bigger countries attenuates the risk that results
might be driven by few very large firms, and by particular sectors, which in smaller
countries might represent a considerable share of total patenting activities. Details on
the data are presented in Appendix A.3.
For  each  sample  we present  results  both  using  all  available  years  (1980 -
2009),  and  separately  for  the  sub-periods  1990-2009  and  2000-2009,  so  as  to
appreciate any diachronic changes in the underlying relations. For each estimation, we
also report results which exclude the United States, for reasons which will become
clear shortly.  We discuss the results of Table 4 and 5 in conjunction. Please note,
again, that when discussing the effect of a given variable, this will be the level (or its
log) in the cross-section results of Table 4, and the difference between the levels (or
their logs) in countries i and j, in the empirical model of Table 5.
Before  we  turn  to  the  results,  we  observe  that,  overall,  the  explanatory
variables that we use only account for a fairly modest share of the total variation of
the dependent  variables,  where the  R2 of the pooled models  of  Table  5 hoover  at
around 40%, which however is reached mostly thanks to the inclusion of the various
fixed effects. To exemplify, we consider the results of the model of column (1), Table
5. The R2 equals 0.357, which would be reduced to 0.280 if we excluded the six main
regressors,  whose estimate  are  reported  in  the  table,  while  including all  the fixed
effects.  The  combined  presence  of  the  independent  variables  of  interest  leads  to
explaining  7.7%  of  the  total  variation  of  the  dependent  variable  (the  difference
between the  two values  of  the  R2).  While  these  variables  leave  most  of  the  total
variance of the phenomenon unexplained, in commenting results we will note that
their  individual  estimated  effect,  as  represented  by  the  standardized  estimated
coefficients, most times are of considerable magnitude.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
To test  H3 (see Section 2), we include among the regressors a measure of a








which is equal to the log of the ratio of a country patent portfolio, computed as the
average of the inventories obtained using the inventor and the applicant criterion, and
GDP.16
In the cross-section results of Table 4, the effect is estimated to be negative in
most cases, while individually it is significantly different from zero only in more than
40% of the estimates, when the US is excluded from the dataset. The results of Table
5 for the whole 1980 – 2009 period, on the other hand, unambiguously indicate a
significant negative impact of  Innov|GDP on the inventor balance when the smaller
set of countries is considered (Panel B), and indicate contrasting results for the bigger
set of countries. Pieced together, our results tend to confirm the hypothesis that, in the
last decade, economies which are highly innovative relative to their level of economic
development,  specialized  in  the  provision  of  organizations  vs. inventors.  The
magnitude  of  the  effect,  as  estimated  in  column  (7),  Table  5,  in  terms  of  its
standardized coefficient  is equal to -0.42 – that is,  a standard deviation change in
Innov|GDP is associated with about 0.4 negative standard deviation change in the
dependent variable.
All  our  results  unambiguously  support  H4 and  H5:  patent  inventories
positively  affect  the  inventor  balance,  when  adopting  the  inventor  criterion,  and
negatively,  when looking at  applicants.17 The effect  is  sizeable,  with standardized
estimated  coefficients  that  in  most  cases  are  above  4  in  absolute  values  (for  the
models of Panel A, Table 5). Also, technological specialization has a positive and
significant effect on  the inventor balance,18 when the whole period 1980 – 2009 is
16 This measure may be criticized on the ground that the numerator depends cru-
cially on the propensity to patent, which varies across countries. See, however, De
Rassenfosse and de la Potterie (2009).
17 Please note that to express these measures we only employed national patents,
a feature made possible by the type of measures which we adopt.  In other words,
these measures do not include data which also enter in the definition of the dependent
variables.
18 See Appendix A.3. We use a measure of technological specialization over the
five macro-areas because they imply meaningful technological distinctions. Using a
more granular measure of technological specialization, defined in terms of the 35 con-
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considered. The pooled fixed effects model also indicates a similar positive effect,
with an estimated coefficient equal to 0.341, significant at the 5% level. Together with
the descriptive evidence of Table 3, indicating persistence of outcome, these results
provide support to H6. However, overall the effect that we detect is rather modest in
magnitude. For example, the estimated coefficient of column (1), Table 5, implies that
a  one  standard  deviation  change  of  the  technological  specialization  variable  is
associated with a change in the dependent variable that is slightly less than 1/10 of a
standard deviation. 
Besides testing the main hypotheses  of our conceptual  framework,  we also
controlled for two possible further factors, related to formal and informal institutions,
which  may  affect  the  inventor  balance.  We  find  inconclusive  evidence  on  the
relevance of the degree of IPR protection. The coefficients are never significant when
considering the larger  group of countries (Panel A in both Table 4 and Table 5).
When, in the analysis of Table 5 (Panel B), we only consider the smaller group of
larger  patenting  countries,  the  estimated  coefficients  are  strongly  significant  and
negative only in the last decade (2000-2009), and also in the period 1990-2009 if the
US are excluded. These results provide some support to the view that countries with
strong IPRs protection are more likely to specialize as applicant-organizations,  but
only for countries with a sizeable patent portfolio and only in the last decade. The
overall evidence on the effect of IPRs is however rather mixed.
We also consider the effect of individualistic cultural traits. Results depend on
whether we include or not the United States. We first consider the results using the
pooled estimator (Table 5). When we include the United States, we find a negative
and significant effect of both cultural variables in all cases (columns (1) - (3), and (7)
- (9), Table 5). This might be because the United States rank first in individualism,
and at the same time are the home base of many important MNEs. In fact, when we
exclude the United States, the results are reversed and significant for the whole period
1980-2009 and also for 1990-2009 (columns (4) – (5), Table 5). The cross-section
estimates (Table 4) are less sensitive to the exclusion of a single observation, and in
both  cases  indicate  a  positive  effect  of  individualism  on  the  inventor  balance.
However,  we note  that  the  median  of  the  estimated  coefficients  and the  share  of
significant coefficients increase when we exclude the United States (Panel B, Table
4).
stituent technologies categorized by Schmoch (2008), leads to very similar results. 
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We  conclude  that  individualism  leads  to  an  inventor  surplus,  but  only  when
excluding from the analysis the important exception of the United States, which is
characterized both by the highest degree of individualism, and by a strong applicant
surplus, and whose “exceptionalism” in the field of innovation emerges also from the
present analysis.  To assess the magnitude of this  effect,  we refer to  the model  of
column (4), Table 5, which excludes the US and indicates a positive and significant
effect  of  individualism.  The magnitude  of  the effect  as  measured  by standardized
coefficients  implies  that  a  standard  deviation  change in  the  dependent  variable  is
associated with about 1/3 standard deviation positive change in the inventor balance.
Particularly in the early years under consideration, we record many missing
values for the dependent variable, corresponding to cases where there was no bilateral
collaboration  between a given pair  of  countries.  To correct  for  a  possible  sample
selection  bias  we  also  estimate  the  model  using  Heckman’s  Lambda  Method
(Wooldridge 2002), which employs a two-stage estimation method. In the first stage,
regressors include factors determining the probability for a country pair to record at
least  one international  collaboration.  In the second stage,  the residuals of the first
stage  (the  “Lambda”  variable)  are  included  as  control  variable  to  correct  for  any
selection bias. In all cases we reject the null hypotheses that the errors of the equation
of  interest,  and  of  the  selection  equation,  are  correlated.  As  a  consequence,  the
estimates using the Heckman estimator are very similar to the ones obtained using
OLS (see Appendix A.4, supplementary results, Table 5A).
Also,  we address  the  possibility  that  unobservable  variables  are  correlated
within country pairs,  by estimating the pooled models  of Table 5 while  assuming
errors  clustered  by  country  pairs.  Such  an  estimation  technique,  where  we  also
include, as before, time and country dummies, is quite onerous on the data, and it is
expected  to  produce  wider  estimated  standard  errors.  However,  by  and  large  we
obtain results  similar  to  those of Table 5,  again confirming the robustness  of  our
conclusions (see Appendix A.4, supplementary results, Table 5B).
7. Discussion and conclusions
Most innovations are the product of a matching between organizations and inventors.
In  a  world  where  such  production  increasingly  occurs  at  the  global  scale,  some
countries  may  specialize  in  providing  one  or  the  other.  In  this  article  we  have
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provided  a  coherent  picture  of  the  extent,  geographic  patterns,  and  general
characteristics  of  this  type  of  functional  specialization.  Its  magnitude  is  often
considerable  and  has  increased  on  average  during  the  last  three  decades.  We
interpreted this result  as evidence of a progressive decoupling of two sub-systems
supplying  respectively  inventors  and  organizations,  as  the  degree  of
internationalization  in  the  production  of  invention  has  generally  increased.   Our
results, together with the conceptual framework which we adopted, set the stage for
some final reflections, more of a speculative nature, on what policy suggestions might
be drawn.
The  presence  of  the  strong  imbalances  that  we  have  documented  poses
problems and opportunities to policy makers,  which are usefully considered in the
light of a wider literature on so-called “technology gaps”. These gaps appear to have
been increasing since the 1970s (Kemeny 2011, and Toivanen and Suominen 2015),
notwithstanding the observed convergence in human capital  among developed and
developing countries (Canestracci 2011). Both the evidence on technology gaps, and
our analysis of the inventor surplus, suggest that developing countries are at risk of
being trapped in what might be indicated as a “low-invention equilibrium”, or even of
losing ground. Well-meaning policies, aimed at improving the supply of invention-
grade  specialists,  could  result  in  these  specialists  being  employed  abroad,  or
domestically by foreign MNEs, but with no meaningful spillovers being created. This
might  result  in  wider  global  technological  gaps  between  leaders  and  followers
(Toivanen and Suominen 2015, and Kemeny 2011), that is, the opposite of what is
desired.  In  a  sense,  in  such  cases  policies  would  in  fact  be  functional  to  an
international  division of labour where few countries “cream skim” those activities
exhibiting the highest value added. Such risk, arguably, is today particularly acute in
the information and communication technologies,  where few big platforms, mostly
based in the United States, have taken advantage of the unique cost structure of digital
goods,  coupled  with  the  presence  of  powerful  network  effects,  to  produce  huge
profits. Specialists educated abroad, at a high cost, contribute to those very lucrative
activities, with very little advantages, and many disadvantages, for their originating
countries.
Under  this  light,  policies  aimed  at  improving  higher  technical  education
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should be accompanied by explicit provisions to facilitate absorption and spillovers.19
Also, policies should aim at transferring inventive-specific organizational capabilities,
such  as  technology  and  science  management  routines,  which  are  essential  to  the
catch-up process. In this context, our “inventor balance” measure is well-suited as a
sector-specific  monitoring  tool,  as  it  allows  policy  makers  to  appreciate  how
imbalances  evolve in time, to better assess the effects of past interventions, and to
tailor future ones.
For what concerns the countries which are close to the technology frontier,  we
took  notice  of  the  recent  reported  tendency  of  MNEs  to  improve  the  flows  of
information  among  their  R&D  labs  around  the  world  (Laurens  et  al.  2015a  and
2015b).  However,  such  developments,  accompanied  by  general  progresses  in
information  and  communication  technologies,  might  also  increase  the  risk  of
undesired spillovers abroad, eventually hollowing out the productive base of the host
country.  Obviously,  this  scenario  would be beneficial  to  those countries  trying  to
escape the “low-innovation equilibrium” which we have discussed above.
Recent research on the diffusion of knowledge provides some support to such
a possibility. Whereas Chen and Guan (2016), using a patent citation analysis, show
that knowledge flows are very intense within a core group of countries, while those
from these countries to peripheral ones are weaker, an emerging body of evidence
points to the presence and relevance of reverse flows of knowledge originating from
developing countries. They are the result of MNEs, based in developing countries,
tapping into industrialized countries human capital and organizational assets (Giuliani
et al. 2014, 2016), and occasionally carrying out various types of reverse and frugal
innovation (Zeschky et al. 2014). For countries close to the technology frontier, the
“inventor balance” measure is also well-suited as a sector-specific monitoring tool of
such dynamics.
Countries desiring to address the imbalances which we have analysed upon
could also focus on the connection between the two sub-systems – inventors’ and
organizations’. There are several examples of policies that might be seen as aiming at
19 For example, Padilla-Perez and Gaudin (2013) show for Central America that
FDI attraction policies did not include policy tools to promote indigenous capabilities
or  even technology absorption.  On a similar  vein,  see also Athreye  and Cantwell
(2007). 
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reducing their decoupling in various ways.20
 In providing a conceptual framework of innovation systems in a world where
inventive  activities  are  increasingly  internationalized,  we  have  implicitly  adopted
some  simplifying  assumptions.  In  particular,  we  have  assumed  that  the  two  sub-
systems, while receiving feedbacks from the invention production function level, are
domestic  in  nature.  This  characterization  is  consistent  with evidence  showing that
innovation systems, even though increasingly internationalized, still rely on country-
specific  institutions  (Carlsson  2006).  To  some  extent,  ours  is  only  a  useful
simplification of a more complex reality.  For example,  the higher echelons of the
education system might be able to directly attract talented students from abroad (Soete
et al. 2010). Such interconnection might be seen as  the other side of the coin of the
'macro' view which we have embraced: as domestic actors become embedded in more
than one national innovation systems, the distinction between what is “national” and
what is “international” becomes blurred.
While  patent  data  are  a  useful  mean  to  measure  inventive  activities,  they
account only for codified knowledge. They thus might underestimate the extent of
tacit knowledge present in foreign and domestic locations, and its role in determining
functional specialization. In addition, our data, and our overall ‘macro’ approach, are
silent  on  how  the  micro-level  nature  and  characteristics  of  firms  may  determine
specific patterns of functional specialization. Future research could exploit emerging
big datasets on firms and on their patenting activities, so as to study their behaviours
under the light of the present findings. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Measures of internationalization in Picci (2010). 
The strength of the collaboration between inventors in country  i and applicants in
country j, for a single patent p, is defined as follows:
InvAppijp = Invip · Appjp .
Summing over patents (1,2, ... P) provides a measure of the strength of the overall





We measure internationalization through the measure InvAppInv, introduced in Picci
(2010). It is a relative measure, which expresses the share of international patents in a





A.2 Taxonomy of technologies (Schmoch 2008).
Electr  (Electrical engineering)
1 - Electrical machinery, apparatus, energy: F21#, H01B, H01C, H01F, H01G, H01H, H01J,
H01K, H01M,  H01R, H01T, H02#, H05B, H05C, H05F, H99Z.
2 - Audio-visual technology: G09F, G09G, G11B, H04N-003, H04N-005, H04N-009, H04N-
013, H04N-015, H04N-017, H04R, H04S, H05K.
3 - Telecommunications: G09F, G09G, G11B, H04N3, H04N5, H04N9, H04N13, H04N15,
H04N17, H04R, H04S, H05K, H04W, G08C, H01P, H01Q, H04B, H04H, H04J,
H04K, H04M, H04N1, H04N7, H04N11, H04Q, H04W.
4 - Digital communication : H04L.
5 - Basic communication processes: H03.
6 - Computer technology: G06 (but not G06Q), G11C, G10L.
7 - IT methods for management: G06Q.
8 - Semiconductors: H01L.
Instr (Instruments)
9 - Optics: G02, G03B, G03C, G03D, G03F, G03G, G03H, H01S.
10 - Measurement: G01B, G01C, G01D, G01F, G01G, G01H, G01J, G01K, G01L, G01M,
G01N, G01N33G01P, G01R, G01S, G01V, G01W, G04, G12B, G99Z.
11- Analysis of biological materials: G01N33.
12 - Control: G05B, G05D, G05F, G07, G08B, G08G, G09B, G09C, G09D.
13 - Medical technology:  A61B, A61C, A61D, A61F, A61G, A61H, A61J, A61L, A61M,
A61N, H05G.
Chem (Chemistry)
14 - Organic fine chemistry:  C07B, C07C, C07D, C07F, C07H, C07J, C40B, A61K8, A61Q.
15 - Biotechnology:  C07G, C07K, C12M, C12N, C12P, C12Q, C12R, C12S. 
16 - Pharmaceuticals: A61K, A61K8, A61P (added, not present in WIPO document).
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17 - Macromolecular chemistry, polymers:  C08B, C08C, C08F, C08G, C08H, C08K, C08L
18 - Food chemistry: A01H, A21D, A23B, A23C, A23D, A23F, A23G, A23J, A23K, A23L,
C12C, C12F, C12G, C12H, C12J, C13D, C13F, C13J, C13K.
19 - Basic materials chemistry: A01N, A01P, C05, C06, C09B, C09C, C09F, C09G, C09H,
C09K,  C09D,  C09J,  C10B,  C10C,  C10F,  C10G,  C10H,  C10J,  C10K,  C10L,
C10M, C10N, C11B, C11C, C11D, C99Z.
20 - Materials, metallurgy: C01, C03C, C04, C21, C22, B22.  
21 - Surface technology, coating:  B05C, B05D, B32, C23, C25, C30.  
22 - Micro-structure and nano-technology: B81, B82. 
23 - Chemical engineering: B01B, B01D0, B01D1, B01D2, B01D, B01D41, B01D5 (added,
not  clear  in  WIPO document),  B01D8 (added,  not  clear  in  WIPO document),
B01D9  (added,  not  clear  in  WIPO  document),  B01D43,  B01D57,  B01D59,
B01D6, B01D7, B01F, B01J, B01L, B02C, B03, B04, B05B, B06B, B07, B08,
D06B, D06C, D06L, F25J, F26, C14C, H05H.  
24 - Micro-structure and nano-technology:  A62D , B01D45 , B01D46 , B01D47 , B01D49 ,
B01D50 , B01D51 , B01D52 , B01D53, B09,  B65F, C02, F01N, F23G, F23J,
G01T, E01F8, A62C. 
Mech (Mechanical engineering)
25 - Handling:  B25J, B65B, B65C, B65D, B65G, B65H, B66, B67.  
26 - Machine tools: B21, B23, B24, B26D, B26F, B27, B30, B25B, B25C, B25D, B25F,
B25G, B25H, B26B.  
27 - Engine pumps, turbines:  F01B, F01C, F01D, F01K, F01L, F01M, F01P, F02, F03, F04,
F23R, G21, F99Z.  
28 - Textile and paper machines:  A41H, A43D, A46D, C14B, D01, D02, D03, D04B, D04C,
D04G, D04H, D05, D06G, D06H, D06J, D06M, D06P, D06Q, D99Z, B31, D21,
B41.  
29 - Other special machines:  A01B, A01C, A01D, A01F, A01G, A01J, A01K, A01L, A01M,
A21B, A21C, A22, A23N, A23P, B02B, C12L, C13C, C13G, C13H, B28, B29,
C03B, C08J, B99Z, F41, F42.  
30 - Thermal processes and apparatus: F22, F23B, F23C, F23D, F23H, F23K, F23L, F23M,
F23N, F23Q, F24, F25B, F25C, F27, F28.  
31 - Mechanical elements: F15, F16, F17, G05G.  
32 - Transport: B60, B61, B62, B63B, B63C, B63G, B63H, B63J, B64.  
Other (Other fields)
33 - Furniture, games: A47, A63.  
34 - Other consumer goods: A24, A41B, A41C, A41D, A41F, A41G, A42, A43B, A43C,
A44,  A45,  A46B,  A62B,  B42,  B43,  D04D,  D07,  G10B,  G10C,  G10D,  G10F,
G10G, G10H, G10K, B44, B68, D06F, D06N, F25D, A99Z.
35 -  Civil  engineering:  E02,  E01B,  E01C,  E01D,  E01F1,  E01F3, E01F5, E01F7, E01F9,
E01F1, E01H, E03, E04, E05, E06, E21, E99Z.
A.3 Data description 
Patent data.
Source  and  methodology: European  Patent  Office  (2013a,  2013b).  See  the
methodological description in Section 3. Patstat allows for the tracking of multiple
applications claiming the right to priority for the same invention in different offices,
and for avoiding double count within patent families. Considering patent applications,
instead  of  granted  patents,  allows  for  the  analysis  of  more  recent  data  (since  the
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granting process may take several years). The 50 patent offices that we consider are
the  national  patent  offices  of  all  OECD  countries,  countries  invited  to  open
discussions for membership to the OECD (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South
Africa),  plus  those  of  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Honk  Kong,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Malta,
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, and the European Patent Office. In all cases, we
adopt so-called “fractional counting” of patents:  for example,  if a patent has three
inventors and two applicants, the inventors are counted 1/3 each, and the applicants
½, so that each patent always counts as one, regardless of whether the inventor or the
applicant criterion is chosen. 
These computations also are done fractionally,  so that patents with multiple
codes belonging to more than one macro-technology are counted appropriately.  See
Appendix A.2 for a detailed description of the constituent technologies in terms of the
IPC classification, and how they are aggregated to form the five macro-technologies.
The term “international” is here used purely out of convenience, and with no
reference to where the first filing occurred – nationally, to a regional office such as
the European Patent Office, or via the so called “international route”.
We have information on patents with inventors and applicants from a total of
52 countries, but the contribution of some of them is marginal and in some cases neg-
ligible. The number of observations for which we have international collaborations
ranges from 24 in 1980 to 27 in 2009. Some countries, such as the Russian Federa-
tion, are not present in our dataset on internationalization in the early 1980s and were
thus not included. Two groups of countries are considered: a smaller one, of 12 coun-
tries:  Canada,   China,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  South  Korea,
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States of America. A bigger one, of 27
countries, also includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, Hungary, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey.
Tech specialization: we use Krugman (1991) index of technological  specialization
over five technological macro-sectors defined as in Appendix A.2 (Schmoch 2008).
The Krugman index TS expresses the degree by which country shares of different





where |.| indicates the absolute value, α s,i  is the share of technology s (s=1,2,…5, in
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our case) in country i and α s,−i  is the share of technology s in the rest of the world. It
is easy to show that    0≤  TSi ≤ 2. At its lower bound, the technological structure of a
country is the same as the rest of the world. At its upper bound, the country does not
share any technology with the rest of the world.
Individualism.  Source:  Hofstede  (2001).  We  use  the  well-known  measure  of
individualism by Hofstede. Questionnaire-based elicitation, 88000 respondents across
72 countries. 
Distance. the distance between the capital cities of pairs of countries computed with
the great circle formula.
Border:  a  dummy indicating  the  presence  of  a  common  border  between  pairs  of
countries.
Timezone: difference in time zone between pair of countries. 
Intellectual Property Rights. Source: Park (2008). Measure of level IPR protection
from Park (2008).
Language similarity. Source: Fearon (2003), author’s database updated in 2009. The
similarity between couple of languages is computed using data from the Ethnologe
Project (http://www.ethnologue.com/),  as collected and organized by James Fearon
(see Fearon 2003). The similarity between two languages is based on the distance
between “tree branches” (Fearon 2003). Unlike in Fearon’s work, who obtains his
measure by dividing the number of branches that are in common by the maximum
number of branches that any language has (which is equal to 15), we divide it by the
maximum number  of branches within each couple of language,  so as to  take into
account  that  the  granularity  of  the  branch definition  may be not  the  same across
languages.
Gross Domestic Product. Source: World Economic Outlook. Gross domestic product




Table 2A. Bilateral inventor balance, 2000-2009, by sector












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Countries with world share of patents > 0.5%. 
Country i: horizontal, first row. Country j: in bold in empty columns.
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Table 5A. Determinants of bilateral inventor balance. Heckman’s Lambda Method.
Panel A. Countries with world share of patents > 0.1%.
Dep. Variable:
Bilateral inventor balance. (eq. 2)
(1) All countries (n=27) (2) Excluding the US
1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009 1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009
Innov|GDP 0.168*** 0.0578 -0.402** 0.160** 0.0552 -0.432**
(0.0466) (0.0600) (0.131) (0.0516) (0.0652) (0.139)
Log(inv-national) 1.663*** 1.238*** 1.330*** 1.727*** 1.229*** 1.256***
(0.0863) (0.103) (0.201) (0.0989) (0.116) (0.219)
Log(app-national) -1.785*** -1.266*** -0.958*** -1.831*** -1.248*** -0.852***
(0.0899) (0.110) (0.204) (0.104) (0.124) (0.220)
IPR -0.00947 -0.0123 0.00626 -0.0139 -0.0146 0.0151
(0.00743) (0.00857) (0.0122) (0.00874) (0.0102) (0.0155)
Tech specialization 0.289*** 0.119 0.0360 0.280*** 0.134 0.0383
(0.0491) (0.0702) (0.126) (0.0572) (0.0786) (0.134)
Individualism -1.331*** -2.273*** -5.503*** 0.0871*** 0.0804*** 0.0000937
(0.369) (0.493) (1.117) (0.00913) (0.0110) (0.0207)
Observations 18750 12750 6500 17280 11760 6000
of which, uncensored 10898 8284 4688 9452 7296 4188
Rho 0.000601 0.000371 -0.000257 0.000925  0.000694 0.000164
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




(3) All countries (n=12) (4) Excluding the US
1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009 1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009
Innov|GDP -0.251*** -0.382*** -0.621** -0.321*** -0.452*** -0.751***
(0.0762) (0.0903) (0.192) (0.0889) (0.104) (0.211)
Log(inv-national) 0.755*** 0.776*** 1.436*** 0.428 0.423 1.279**
(0.185) (0.210) (0.399) (0.224) (0.244) (0.458)
Log(app-national) -0.554** -0.457* -0.851 -0.168 -0.0520 -0.566
(0.183) (0.210) (0.451) (0.226) (0.249) (0.520)
IPR 0.0167 -0.0229 -0.0857*** 0.00780 -0.0365* -0.105***
(0.0132) (0.0144) (0.0208) (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0288)
Tech specialization 0.317*** 0.0187 -0.0504 0.361*** 0.101 0.0722
(0.0844) (0.112) (0.273) (0.101) (0.130) (0.300)
Individualism -5.064*** -5.936*** -7.567*** 0.0478*** 0.0361* -0.00461
(0.589) (0.711) (1.727) (0.0138) (0.0162) (0.0307)
Observations 3300 2200 1100 2700 1800 900
of which, uncensored 2815 2058 1082 2218 1658 882
Rho -0.000278 0.000000951 -0.000000365 -0.000279 -0.000000142 0.000000193
Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note:  Estimation  method:  Heckman’s  lambda  method.  1st stage  equations  use  the  following  regressors:
log(GDP), log patent inventory (both according to the inventor and the applicant criterion), for both for i and j
countries; the logged distance between capitals, the distance in terms of time zones, a dummy representing the
presence of a common border, a measure of technological proximity, and a measure of linguistic proximity.
The selection equation may be seen as a gravity model, where the dependent variable is binary and it indicates
whether there was collaboration in inventive activities between two countries. Because of the symmetric nature
of the problem, regressors  are defined as the difference between observations in country i and j – see the
discussion in Section 5. A positive estimated coefficient implies that a positive impact on the inventor balance,
when present in  i, and a negative one, of exactly the same magnitude, when present in  j.  Time and country
fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source of the
data: see Appendix A.3.
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Table 5B. Determinants of bilateral inventor balance. OLS, clustered errors.




(1) All countries (n=27) (2) Excluding the US
1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009 1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009
Innov|GDP 0.193** 0.0472 -0.460*** 0.181* 0.0372 -0.494***
(0.0689) (0.0864) (0.131) (0.0758) (0.0932) (0.138)
Log(inv-national) 1.466*** 1.146*** 1.248*** 1.497*** 1.131*** 1.178***
(0.127) (0.121) (0.175) (0.139) (0.132) (0.190)
Log(app-national) -1.613*** -1.168*** -0.831*** -1.624*** -1.140*** -0.726***
(0.138) (0.140) (0.179) (0.153) (0.154) (0.192)
IPR -0.0136 -0.0154 0.00484 -0.0191 -0.0184 0.0123
(0.0111) (0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0166)
Tech specialization 0.284*** 0.120 0.0542 0.281** 0.139 0.0563
(0.0747) (0.0865) (0.112) (0.0863) (0.0950) (0.120)
Individualism -1.147 -2.324** -5.969*** 0.0924*** 0.0784*** -0.00754
(0.586) (0.735) (1.148) (0.0146) (0.0177) (0.0243)
Observations 12152 9194 5182 10646 8166 4662
R2 0.357 0.367 0.440 0.316 0.328 0.403




(1) All countries (n=12) (2) Excluding the US
1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009 1980-2009 1990-2009 2000-2009
Innov|GDP -0.221 -0.367** -0.652*** -0.304* -0.467** -0.774***
(0.124) (0.133) (0.166) (0.143) (0.155) (0.178)
Log(inv-national) 0.580** 0.553* 1.054** 0.352* 0.307 0.949*
(0.212) (0.241) (0.351) (0.237) (0.261) (0.407)
Log(app-national) -0.413 -0.258 -0.472 -0.117 0.0605 -0.255
(0.254) (0.275) (0.388) (0.292) (0.308) (0.446)
IPR 0.00838 -0.0315 -0.0881*** -0.000. -0.0441 -0.113***
(0.0224) (0.0179) (0.0224) (0.0274) (0.0230) (0.0321)
Tech specialization 0.269* -0.00973 -0.0536 0.307* 0.0777 0.0332
(0.119) (0.138) (0.209) (0.140) (0.152) (0.230)
Individualism -0.0944*** -0.0962*** -0.102*** 0.0938*** 0.0203 -0.0164
(0.0209) (0.0201) (0.0237) (0.0220) (0.0298) (0.0398)
Observations 3392 2464 1296 2734 2024 1076
R2 0.501 0.501 0.548 0.466 0.467 0.516
Note. Standard errors clustered by country pairs. Because of the symmetric nature of the problem, regressors
are defined as the difference between observations in country i and j – see the discussion in Section 5. A
positive estimated coefficient implies that a positive impact on the inventor balance, when present in i, and a
negative one, of exactly the same magnitude, when present in j. Time and country fixed effects are included.




Table 1. Total patent portfolios, top-ten patenting countries in 2009.
Year 1980 1995 2009
Country N. patents % N. patents % N. patents %
JP 165968 56.4 318989 58.2 261549 40.1
KR 307 0.1 26267 4.8 113274 17.4
US 38178 13.0 73920 13.5 51265 7.9
CN 8 0.0 8927 1.6 47088 7.2
DE 27784 9.4 31257 5.7 44843 6.9
TW 122 0.0 2535 0.5 24884 3.8
UK 10129 3.4 18887 3.4 16740 2.6
FR 10693 3.6 11765 2.1 14512 2.2
IT 7194 2.4 7770 1.4 10404 1.6
NL 2085 0.7 2783 0.5 4122 0.6
Total 
(52 countries)
294408 100.0 548300 100.0 652650 100.0
Note: Number of patents are rounded, and computed according to the applicant criterion, using   fractional
counting, and including the case where i=j, i.e. also domestic patents. Shares (%) are computed over the
sum of all 52 countries patent portfolios included in the analysis.
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ROW CA CH CN DE FR IT JP KR NL TW UK US
CA 4    .54    .52 -   .02    .04    .23 -   .36    .47    .77 -   .28    .17 -   .66    .65
CH 10 -   .56 -   .52 -   .57 -   .55 -   .88 -   .82 -   .57    .20 -   .38 -   .14 -   .65 -   .18
CN 1    .77    .02    .57    .69    .41 -   .38    .26    .65    .55    .81    .50    .84
DE 6    .19 -   .04    .55 -   .69 -   .00 -   .51    .30    .45    .20 -   .24 -   .53    .60
FR 3    .36 -   .23    .88 -   .41    .00 -   .18    .65    .77    .69    .93    .29    .47
IT 0    .66    .36    .82    .38    .51    .18    .19    .82    .49    .15    .57    .88
JP 6    .07 -   .47    .57 -   .26 -   .30 -   .65 -   .19    .84    .72    .45 -   .80    .08
KR 10 -   .34 -   .77 -   .20 -   .65 -   .45 -   .77 -   .82 -   .84 -   .74    .83 -   .78 -   .14
NL 7 -   .35    .28    .38 -   .55 -   .20 -   .69 -   .49 -   .72    .74    .57 -   .63 -   .26
TW 8 -   .01 -   .17    .14 -   .81    .24 -   .93 -   .15 -   .45 -   .83 -   .57 -   .29    .56
UK 3    .63    .66    .65 -   .50    .53 -   .29 -   .57    .80    .78    .63    .29    .83
US 8 -   .49 -   .65    .18 -   .84 -   .60 -   .47 -   .88 -   .08    .14    .26 -   .56 -   .83
Note: Countries with world share of patents > 0.5%. Vertical: country i; horizontal: country j. Second column: 
number of bilateral applicant surpluses. Shaded cells indicate an inventor deficit.
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Table 3. Inventor Balance with respect to the Rest of the World for a selection of 
countries
Country Period All Electr Instr Chem Mech Other All SD
CA 80-89    .40    .15    .44    .52    .41    .33 .0578
 90-99    .14 -   .10    .32    .35    .31    .27 .0844
 00-09    .54    .47    .64    .67    .54    .57 .0361
CH 80-89 -   .44 -   .06 -   .36 -   .47 -   .57 -   .46 .0815
 90-99 -   .54 -   .39 -   .51 -   .57 -   .59 -   .45 .0358
 00-09 -   .56 -   .37 -   .54 -   .62 -   .66 -   .50 .0467
CN 80-89    .38    .19    .72    .08    .46    .90 .1448
 90-99    .33    .53    .56    .18    .35 -   .19 .1242
 00-09    .77    .84    .68    .67    .58    .36 .0941
DE 80-89 -   .10 -   .22 -   .32 -   .21 -   .04 -   .19 .0603
 90-99    .08    .13    .17    .00    .08    .02 .0289
 00-09    .19    .25    .23    .13    .15    .20 .0202
FR 80-89    .73    .85    .80    .62    .74    .72 .0362
 90-99    .53    .45    .60    .51    .60    .77 .0552
 00-09    .36    .08    .53    .45    .72    .67 .1165
IT 80-89    .33    .42    .60    .35    .18    .19 .0710
 90-99    .58    .54    .66    .65    .47    .42 .0434
 00-09    .66    .70    .56    .67    .62    .69 .0235
JP 80-89 -   .01    .00 -   .29    .22 -   .12 -   .25 .0901
 90-99 -   .01 -   .16 -   .14    .34 -   .07    .06 .0827
 00-09    .07 -   .09    .16    .50    .09    .44 .1177
KR 80-89 -   .56 -   .44 -   .48 -   .71 -   .71 -   .23 .0835
 90-99 -   .62 -   .77 -   .49 -   .54 -   .36 -   .46 .0754
 00-09 -   .34 -   .51 -   .41 -   .35    .01    .33 .1555
NL 80-89 -   .25 -   .09    .02 -   .33 -   .22 -   .51 .0830
 90-99 -   .19 -   .19    .04 -   .25 -   .11 -   .32 .0556
 00-09 -0.35 -   .57 -   .28 -   .16    .10 -   .24 .1098
TW 80-89    .13    .27 -   .02    .39    .20    .04 .0690
 90-99 -   .69 -   .70 -   .62 -   .38 -   .75 -   .71 .0644
 00-09 -   .01 -   .10 -   .04    .24    .18    .23 .0811
UK 80-89    .49    .60    .60    .52    .19    .46 .0683
 90-99    .68    .85    .70    .49    .58    .70 .0553
 00-09    .63    .73    .57    .45    .63    .45 .0558
US 80-89 -   .44 -   .57 -   .46 -   .42 -   .49 -   .29 .0408
 90-99 -   .37 -   .36 -   .49 -   .34 -   .39 -   .51 .0375
 00-09 -   .49 -   .43 -   .44 -   .52 -   .63 -   .67 .0475
Note: Countries with world share of patents > 0.5%. Negative values/shaded cells denote an 
Inventor Deficit. All: all technologies. Other classifications: See Appendix A.2.
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Table 4. Determinants of the Inventor balance (with respect to the Rest of the World). 
Ordinary Least Squares.
Panel A: All countries
Dependent variable: inventor balance, with respect to RoW (eq. 3).











Median -0,045 3,670 -3,631 0,001 0,297 0,006
% p-value 
<0.10 0 100 100 33 20 37
% coeff>0 23 100 0 50 73 97
Binomial 
p-value 0,003 1,000 0,000 0,572 0,997 1,000
Panel B: Excluding the US











Median -0,138 3,337 -3,235 0,008 0,352 0,009
% p-value 
<0.10 43 100 100 33 20 80
% coeff>0 0 100 0 60 83 100
Binomial 
p-value 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,900 1,000 1,000
Note. Summary of results relative to 30 estimated cross-sections (1980-2009). A constant is included in all
regressions. Median: median of the estimated coefficient. % p-value < 0.10: fraction of coefficients estimates
which are significant at least at the 10% level. % coeff> 0: fraction of coefficients estimates which are greater
than zero (equal to the number x of positive estimated coefficients, divided by 30). Binomial p-value: twice the
probability of obtaining a number of successes ≥ x (if x > 15), or ≤ x (if x < 15) in 30 draws of a binomial
random variable where the probability of success equals one half.
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Table 5. Determinants of bilateral inventor balance. OLS.
Panel A. Countries with world share of patents > 0.1%.
Dep. Variable:
Bilateral inventor balance (eq. 2)













Innov|GDP 0.193*** 0.0472 -0.460*** 0.181*** 0.0372 -0.494***
(0.0439) (0.0577) (0.127) (0.0483) (0.0624) (0.134)
Log(inv-national) 1.466*** 1.146*** 1.248*** 1.497*** 1.131*** 1.178***
(0.0743) (0.0916) (0.185) (0.0833) (0.101) (0.201)
Log(app-national) -1.613*** -1.168*** -0.831*** -1.624*** -1.140*** -0.726***
(0.0817) (0.102) (0.188) (0.0925) (0.113) (0.202)
IPR -0.0136 -0.0154 0.00484 -0.0191* -0.0184 0.0123
(0.00713) (0.00823) (0.0118) (0.00832) (0.00970) (0.0148)
Tech specialization 0.284*** 0.120 0.0542 0.281*** 0.139 0.0563
(0.0473) (0.0673) (0.121) (0.0547) (0.0751) (0.129)
Individualism -1.147** -2.324*** -5.969*** 0.0924*** 0.0784*** -0.00754
(0.352) (0.479) (1.083) (0.00856) (0.0105) (0.0200)
Observations 12152 9194 5182 10646 8166 4662
R2 0.357 0.367 0.440 0.316 0.328 0.403
Panel B.  Countries with world share of patents> 0.5%.
Dep. Variable:
Bilateral Inventor Balance (eq. 2)













Innov|GDP -0.221** -0.367*** -0.652*** -0.304*** -0.467*** -0.774***
(0.0694) (0.0865) (0.182) (0.0811) (0.100) (0.199)
Log(inv-national) 0.580*** 0.553** 1.054*** 0.352* 0.307 0.949**
(0.138) (0.170) (0.315) (0.158) (0.189) (0.351)
Log(app-national) -0.413** -0.258 -0.472 -0.117 0.0605 -0.255
(0.146) (0.176) (0.357) (0.170) (0.200) (0.398)
IPR 0.00838 -0.0315* -0.0881*** -0.000 -0.0441** -0.113***
(0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0194) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0266)
Tech specialization 0.269*** -0.00973 -0.0536 0.307** 0.0777 0.0332
(0.0805) (0.107) (0.252) (0.0954) (0.123) (0.273)
Individualism -0.0944*** -0.0962*** -0.102*** 0.0938*** 0.0203 -0.0164
(0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0202) (0.0126) (0.0198) (0.0376)
Observations 3392 2464 1296 2734 2024 1076
R2 0.501 0.501 0.548 0.466 0.467 0.516
Note.  Because  of  the  symmetric  nature  of  the  problem, regressors  are  defined  as  the difference  between
observations in country i and j – see the discussion in Section 5. A positive estimated coefficient implies that a
positive impact on the inventor balance, when present in i, and a negative one, of exactly the same magnitude,
when present in  j. Time and country fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source of the data: see Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1. A conceptual model of the production of inventions at the global scale
48
Figure 2. InvApp/Inv relative measure of internationalization for FR, DE, JP,  
UK and US. 1980-2009.
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